I’m not a big fan of the plus - minus stats specially when it comes to individual performances, I think there are many players involved in whatever happens on the court and that number can lead to misunderstandings.
Anyway in the last Baskonia - FCB we saw a chain of actions that show the value of one of the great players in our basketball, Petteri Koponen. In the beginning of the third quarter, five consecutive possessions, creating a high value for his team on both sides of the court, scoring five points himself and creating another four for Ante Tomic, plus stealing one ball on defense.
Defense, scoring, decision making, play making, to get his team going in less than four minutes.
Also, I’d like to point out one of the offensive situations FCB use during this stretch, which we can see in the video, with a big man posting playing at the elbow for a hand off situation. In this example is precisely Koponen the player who ends up executing the shot coming off Tomic's pass.
Using a shooter and getting advantages of small defensive mistakes to get easy looks for an elite shooter, FCB's playbook has really interesting options.
We explained in the last post how Kyle Hines had an amazing performance switching on ball screen defense.
That brings me to another sign of the complexity of our sport. Although Hines was excellent defending those mismatch situations, the next action happened in one of the last plays of the last quarter. This could be considered one of the “key” moments of the game. After an off ball screen, a mismatch happens, Dixon against Hines… the small playmaker manages to create the space for his shot, and scores.
For me it is interesting to understand how, a situation which was totally under control for Hines all along the game, gave Fenerbahce the opportunity to “believe” one more time in their chances to win the game.
It has been a controversial topic during the last season, specially in the NBA, if the “hack a” strategy is acceptable. We saw a clear example during the game, and I haven’t read many opinions against it… Here is the moment when Itoudis tells CSKA players to "hack a Vesely" right after he shot an air ball in his last free throw attempt. What is your opinion?
I’d like show now some beautiful offensive plays we saw CSKA execute.
In the first one, they run a high ball screen with Hines rolling to the basket. Help side players, whatever their defensive rules are, put extra focus on the ball, and at this point Kurbanov sets an off ball screen against Bogdanovic (De Colo’s defender) to “create” the pass opportunity to the corner, and to make it easy for De Colo to attack the defender close out in case he decides not to shoot.
Let’s finish with two consecutive plays. One of the moments when CSKA started looking unbeatable that night:
This set that is frequently used by many teams, but here is executed with virtuosity, great timing and it shows CSKA at his best. The way Teodosic fakes the screen and then the shot, to end up passing to Hines, and how the american connects with the corner… Fenerbahce players were “chasing shadows”. The next offense they run it again, and the defenders hesitate, in part because of the outcome of the last offense, leaving a highway to the basket for Higgins to score.
Euroleague season is over, the countdown for next season has started.
It’s not the first time I say it, very often we try to find the “key” for the outcome of a game. We go to the statistics, we talk about this or that defensive modification, a beautiful set play drawn by the coach, a player in bad shape or a great offensive performance.
Sometimes we make things too complicated and sometimes we try to over simplify and find one reason to explain why the game ended as it did. The truth is: there isn’t a single key when it comes to sports. That makes it, specially basketball, amazing and unpredictable.
There were so many details during the CSKA - Fenerbahce… It would take days to run through the game trying to understand in deep every single action. So, I will just bring some of them, and I hope we will be able to enjoy in the next years many more games as good as this one.
As they pointed out in @Euro_Adventures podcast that fifth foul might have been one of the luckiest strikes in the last years. Vorontsevich was fouled out and that brought Khryapa back in the game. His performance during the last ten minutes has been praised enough by now but, was he supposed to be there? was he supposed to sub in during the last minutes of the game? We will never know, but a situation that could have been really negative for CSKA turned into the best momentum for them to win the trophy. If that doesn’t make us think as coaches...
The game started with an interesting match up, Kalinic guarding De Colo. Probably to switch ball screens slowing the french down, while avoiding mismatches inside or in the offensive rebound. Seven CSKA points and two personal fouls on the Serbian (who had to be substituted) gave the first “victory” to the Russian side.
It is a frequent topic in this blog, I’ve written about it here, here, here, here, here, and not many days ago here. So it is no surprise to see teams switching in several ball screens. Having players like Kyle Hines (also frequently featured around here) or Udoh helps a lot. We saw many fantastic defensive actions from these players in the final game of the Euroleague season.
I counted 13 situations where Hines switched defending ball screens. Do you know how many points did Fenerbahce score against him? Zero. Not a single point scored by the “small” being guarded by Hines in those switches. Fener scored two points off an offensive rebound (Vesely against Kurbanov) and that was all in 13 possessions. Obviously, there is a team effort there, other players are involved too, but having Hines is an insurance in these situations.
We’ll keep talking about this game in the next post, stay tuned.
Definitely, the use of this "stretch 5" strategy has been one of the reasons for Lokomotiv Kuban to make it all the way to Berlin. It will be interesting to see what kind of adjustments will be made to fight it in the Final Four.
We saw different ways to get advantages through Anthony Randoph during the play off against F.C. Barcelona, let’s take a look at some of them:
Pretty basic, when all five Lokomotiv players are placedbeyond the three point line, creating so many three point threats, there is a lot of room to drive and it is kind of risky to help on penetrations. If Randolph’s defender helps, the opportunity is right there for the kick out pass. Once he gets the ball, the right decision making will end up with shots, penetrations against close outs, or extra passes to beat defensive rotations.
Side screen situations: We are used to “fours” popping after setting ball screens. Not so much to “fives” having that shooting range. Loko often clears the corner and short corner for Randolph to pop to that area. Another shooting threat will be usually placed one pass away from the ball (weak side elbow, three point line on top) making helps on the ball screen situation even harder.
More side screen, now looking for weak side actions: When Randolph's defender doesn’t help, the weak side defenders need to give a hand on the ball screen defense. Movement without the ball is the key now. Weak side cuts are extremely dangerous for the defense. As we see in the second clip, the skip pass is also used to punish defensive rotations.
Middle screen situations: Randoph’s pop creates a superiority right after the ball is passed. Quick shot or pass against defensive rotation. If the defenders hesitate or are late… the dagger will fly.
Finally, one of the sets they run to free Randolph for a wide open shot, with a hand off followed by an off ball screen. Once again, he will decide either to shoot, drive, give an extra pass against rotations or run the set all the way and play one more hand off / side screen. As we see in the last clip, even if the execution is not perfect (they don't play the initial hand off, don't set the small - big off ball screen) the key idea remains the same, Randolph wide open and taking care of business.
The Final Four starts tomorrow, let's get ready for some of the best basketball moments of the year.
I won’t pretend to explain a defensive game plan because not having enough information about it, but I can show you some details of CSKA’s defense during the third play off game against Red Star. If you want to get a deeper understanding, my advice is to analyze those three games to find out how it works.
There’s an old saying in basketball “the best man to man defense looks like a zone and the best zone defense looks like a man to man”. That could be the idea behind the defense we saw in the mentioned game. We can argue about the way we call it (switching man to man, flexible zone, mutant defense) but there’s no need to go crazy about it.
In my opinion, CSKA has the personnel to try this kind of switching defense. Their physicality and size allow them to go for it not giving up a lot of advantages to their rivals. But there’s another idea we should keep in mind. The defense’s “first stone” is not the switching, but the 1 on 1 and team communication. Bigs need to make efforts to guard smalls and smalls need to be really aggressive, as they will find themselves in a quick mismatch situation quite often. Then, the focus to switch or rotate when needed is also a must.
Also, the scouting work matters, Red Star use very often “horns” situations, as well as quick side screens. This switching defense may create problems and definitely slow down the rhythm of the offense.
Some of the rules they appear to be following:
They place a “big” on top of their defense (Kurbanov, Nichols)
They switch high ball screens avoiding an advantage for the “roll man”, and try to keep a small guarding the ball after the first switch.
Continuous attention to the ball’s position and players’ movements
Be aware of cuts, to follow and/or rotate, trying to stay in the same lines. "Smalls" defending outside spaces, "bigs" close to the basket.
Sag off from your man when the ball goes inside
If the mismatch finally happens: FIGHT IT. No easy penetration, no uncontested shots, no easy passes inside (defender in front) Off ball activity.
A lot has been said about Real Madrid's offense in the semifinal against Fenerbahce. Not so much about some defensive details during that game. It is clear that their offense was flowing big time, the ball movement was great, they shared it the right way, the quality of the passing absolutely delicious… But they did some good things on the other half of the court too.
Let's take a look at how they cut Andrew Goudelock's rhythm during the first two quarters of the game. But first one more example about something we've been talking about lately, numbers. You can check Goudelock's points and immediately think that he was dominant (34 minutes, 26 points, 9/11 2PT, 2/6 3PT) But, if you want to dig a little bit more, you will find out how at the end of the second quarter, he had 6 points (2/3 2PT, 0/4 3PT) while his team was trailing by 20 (55-35) and the game was really far from where Fenerbahce would have wanted at that moment…
From the outside, and not knowing first hand what was Real's game plan, it looks like they paid good attention on Goudelock, probably the best 1x1 player in the competition. Let's take a look at some clips:
In the first video, we can see Fenerbahce playing one of their most frequently used sets. They set a down screen and then they play a hand off pass. Not only the player guarding Goudelock is committed to the task in hand, but also the other players are really aggressive. Real gave up some other options while trying to decrease Goudelock's production, which is normal when you focus in one player.
I was talking about cooperation to stop Goudelock before. In the next video we see that team work again. Two clips in which we can see up to three of Real's players (and in the first clip, a fourth giving a hand too) guarding Goudelock in the same play. Yes, he scores in the second one, but every effort counts and they keep making his life a little bit harder with their defense.
More examples, hand off and ball screen situations. We see how the screener's defender is aggressive to stop Goudelock. Aggressive hedging, and again, it is clear that they rather prefer other players to have the scoring opportunities. Help side defenders work against those other options, trying to avoid the easy shot, forcing some drives, rotating…
The last clip might seem naïve, but it is not. A "no helping" policy is advisable when facing some players. It appears Real Madrid decided to use that strategy with Goudelock. There were some actions where helping would have been a right move in a normal situation, but the defender decided not to. Take a look at the next clip.
So let me ask for your opinion: Was Goudelock's defense a success?
There has been some controversy around Teodosic's performance in the semifinal between Olympiacos and CSKA.
I've said this before and it won't be the last time, we, the people, try to find an explanation for victories and defeats, so it is quite normal to hear "this player lost the game" "this player won the game" or "that turnover was the key" and also "the missed three point shots were decisive"... The use of some statistics, or taking a couple of isolated actions appear to be enough to find that explanation we need to feel "we know" what happened and why.
From a coach's point of view, and we have many different examples, the performance of your team rely on many different aspects. And the influence of a player in the development of the game goes, for example, way beyond the points he scores.
Playing the devil's advocate I'm throwing two single numbers in support of Teodosic: he scored 6 of CSKA's 17 points in the last quarter. That's 35% of their total points in the last quarter.
These are Teodosic's offensive actions during the last quarter, those in which he was handling the ball - finishing his team's actions. There was some talking about "ball stopping" and it is clear that he forced some situations (something that Spanoulis did, too… being the outcome the main difference between some of them) but we should review the other four players movement (or lack of) and the spacing they have in some of those actions (not really helpful)
On the other side of the court, we can ask ourselves if Olympiacos' rule was to attack Teodosic, not being his defensive skills his main strength. It looks like he gives up a couple of fouls without a big defensive effort. In the second clip he gives his man a big distance so the pass is easy (and this is quite common when he plays defense on the ball handler)
The way things work on a team, a coach must consider a number of plus and minuses of his players, who is on the court, what is each one giving to the team, the game situation, will he attract the defenders to create opportunities for the other players (there are many different things to think about) and then make a decision about who is playing in a specific moment. But the beauty of sport is also in the decision making, sometimes the right decision looks like a mistake, and sometimes a "crazy" move from the coach ends up working… Sometimes you just need to keep it simple instead of "over coaching"…
But remember, "after the battle everyone's a good general".
I'll be posting in the next days some details we saw during the Euroleague Final Four. In my opinion, it's been an amazing weekend for European basketball, with really good basketball and a good dose of thriller...
We've been talking about the 21st century basketball for a while, its evolution, the way our sport is going… Maybe this Final Four has been a clear example about the "new basketball" we are going to see.
I'm talking about defense now, and specifically about switching against (ball) screens. Will this become the main defensive rule in the years to come?
During the semifinal between Olympiacos and CSKA, we saw how that defense was extensively used by both teams. I bring today two short videos with the teams scoring...
...and getting stops.
Both single (between the two players directly involved in the screen) and multiple (different rotations to avoid mismatches) switching options were played during the game. It's no surprise that many teams are building their rosters with this idea in mind, trying to find players as physical as possible, capable to play solid defense in different situations. Other teams work on ways to switch with "smaller personnel", and still cut the offense's rhythm.
What's your opinion, are we going to watch more and more switching?
Ball screen actions, probably the most frequently used tactical tool in modern basketball, is extensively studied on both sides of the court. It will be one of the keys during the Final Four, as the teams that will be in Madrid excel in the use of this "art" and have terrific players to execute it.
It would be too long to analyze every single option we will find during the Final Four in one post, so this is a small study about one of them, which I think will be important in the semifinal between Fenerbahce and Real Madrid: Nemanja Bjelica on ball side corner and two smalls on the opposite side. This is often played by the Turkish team, and it will be interesting to see how it will work, and Real's defensive answers.
There are different ways to approach a specific situation from the defensive side. For example, you can have a rule you follow no matter what (e.g. "whenever they play a side screen, we "trap") and you can also consider who are the players involved and then adapt the defense.
Let's take a look at different scenarios (and let's consider the "1", "2", and "3" positions interchangeable. So I won't talk about "positions" but about characteristics of the players at each one). Always understanding that (in the opinion of many experts) the Euroleague's best "stretch 4", Nemanja Bjelica, is in the ball side corner (he is "4")
For opposing teams, it would be wise to avoid 4's defender helps against 5's roll (giving room for Bjelica to receive a quick pass): it is an extremely dangerous situation, Bjelica being a huge threat. He can catch and shoot, and he can drive to beat the defender's close out.
If the defense manages to avoid these two situations, they often play a "5 x 4" ball screen which creates a new advantage either for Bjelica to score, or for their "5" to roll hard when he has an advantage or crush the board when Bjelica drives.
Allow "1" to shoot, go under the screen: if you rather prefer that shot (e.g. when the ball handler is not a great shooter) than any other option the offense can find. As usual, scouting and "numbers" will help in the decision making process. No helps needed, no "Bjelica's threat"
Do not allow "1" to shoot, go over the screen and collapse the paint avoiding penetration: this option should be considered when you think "2" and "3" threats are smaller than "1's". The screener's defender will try to stop the penetration. As helps will be coming from "weak" side (which we could consider "strong" side once the ball handler drives to the middle) those are dangerous shooting opportunities. And the player getting that pass may try to drive against the close out, so the defenders need to be ready to rotate.
Switch and defend the mismatch, or multiple switching: here, one more time, the defense avoids helping from Bjelica. One problem, Fenerbahce players are very patient to find the way to exploit the advantage. It can be inside, outside, or they can keep playing with very good spacing which usually leads to a good scoring opportunity. Having great "one on one" players makes them really dangerous in mismatch situations.
"Ice", deny the screen: so you don't let the ball handler go to the middle and you create a "traffic" situation on ball side. Fenerbahce can be either very aggressive or very patient against this defensive option. The "aggressive" option: as soon as the screener sees it, he cuts hard to the rim, while the ball handler drives baseline and attracts the screener's defender. Then he can find 5 or the wide open man on the side if there are long helps (a good way to avoid a quick roll is to bump from "2's" defender) Obviously you don't want to help from Bjelica, he is ready to hit the corner three! The "patient" option: the screener will pop and they will attack on the opposite side.
Flash / Trap against the ball handler: trying to stop the ball, being very aggressive to stop penetrations, force turnovers… Although Fenerbahce's spacing plus their high quality players helps them find a good option. First things first, you need to take care of the roll man. We already saw what happens when you help from Bjelica. So you're gonna have to work on defensive fakes and get back real quick after the flash.
A lot to study, many decisions to make, and a small post to show the kind of work coaching staffs are doing "behind the cameras"
Right before tonight's third game, a quick analysis about one of Olympiacos "go to" sets.
These are sets every team has and runs for different reasons. They feel comfortable when playing them, they work well for a key player, or they create problems to the defenders...
Olympiacos look for Spanoulis in many different ways, but in the last game this set was extremely productive for the reds.
A vertical hand off between a big man and the Greek star, that can be followed by a quick ball screen. As a secondary option within the same structure, they can look for the pass to the big man near the basket, but we will focus today on the Spanoulis' option.
As we will see in the video, Olympiacos scored twelve points when running this set, nine of them coming straight from Spanoulis' hands.
In my humble opinion, FCB's defensive game plan was ready to defend it. My guess is they planned to chase Spanoulis, while the big man defending the passer would make a short hedge, and the defender of the corner would collapse the paint.
But mistakes happen during a game, and Spanoulis' execution is admirable so he can score even when the defenders perform well.
For sure tonight we will see this set many times, we will see how it works! Now, let's take a look at the video.
As a coach, when you have a "special" player (understanding that as a player around whom for whatever reasons you are going to organize your offense or your defense) you have to find the way to use him in the best possible way.
Sofoklis Schortsanitis from Maccabi Tel Aviv is one of these players. He is a "go to" player for their offense whenever he is on the court. And today I want to show you how they look for him, and how important for their rivals is to make some adjustments when they face the Israeli team.
Analyzing the Top 16 games between Maccabi and Real Madrid, we see it clear. In the first game, we saw Maccabi running one of their favorite sets for "Big Sofo" and getting a lot of good looks for him. When both teams played again, we noticed how the Spanish side made some adjustments against that set.
Maccabi's set involves a lot of movement without the ball, off ball screens, and, finally, Schortsanitis' duck in action to seal his defender and get the ball inside. It is interesting to notice how he sets a down screen and then he manages to establish his position inside to leave the defender behind his back. Once he gets the ball there… We can see how they run the set and score in the first clip.
Then, for the second game, the Spanish team adjusted their defense, showing much more intensity in order to, first, avoid easy passes at the beginning of the set, and then, trying to keep Sofo off his favorite spot (or forcing him to fight for it)
Nevertheless they end up finding him inside, but Real's players are ready to trap, jumping immediately after the ball leaves the passer's hands. Nocioni's hands up when he traps and Rivers' help side activity as a "goalkeeper" avoid the dangerous skip pass.
With Real Madrid and FC Barcelona still cooling down, and although obviously this is a game that deserves deep analysis, I want to show you this clips from early in the game, with some interesting details.
First, a nice high - low action from Real Madrid. Barcelona often switch in off ball screens when guarding JC Carroll. Real responds well and finds the way to use the mismatch in low post.
Second, another defensive situation from the "madrileños": Maciulis gets on the court and guards Marcelinho Huertas. Maciulis' size and quickness allows him to protect himself from Huertas' penetrations and at the same time he is able to contest shots and switch against ball screens:
It's a situation every team work to stop. When a big guy ends up playing near the basket against a smaller defender you need a team effort and a good defensive organization to fix the mismatch.
The double team is one of the solutions teams use more often. We will see today how Panathinaikos manages to get a stop against that situation through a good team effort, organization, and last but not least, the players' knowledge and awareness. There's no need to say that F.C. Barcelona is one of the best organized teams and they are always ready to react against the double team.
The mismatch happens after a switch in a hand off pass. Abrines finds Doellman in low post. Let's notice how Dimitris Diamantidis, who is on help side, sees the problem even before the ball goes inside and gets ready to trap (there is a reason he's been named Euroleague's best defender so many times).
At the same time, the communication is good between DD and Mavrokefalidis. Help side activity is good, the trap works well (they attack the ball, hands up, avoiding an easy way out…) and they break the timing of the offense. PAO collapse the paint, creating a lot of traffic through help side activity, and they force Doellman to give a bad pass which Mavrokefalidis steals… starting a fastbreak situation.
Last night we watched a great game between EFES and Real Madrid. A tough one that ended up being decided in the last minutes. Let's take a look at some of the last plays of the game. Real looking for options off a middle screen and EFES defending it:
Real played this middle screen three times in the last two minutes of the game (in their last three set offenses) Sergio Rodríguez and Gustavo Ayón running the ball screen and Real's power forward, Nocioni, filling the corner on the left side, with the other two smalls, Carroll and Llull placed one on each side.
EFES defensive rule was clear: they switched between Ayon and Rodriguez's defenders (Lasme and Draper) and made a rotation with one of the weak side defenders when Ayon rolled to the basket. With that rotation, the mismatch after the pick and roll is not so big (it wasn't Draper, but Perperoglou or Osman taking care of Real's big) Perperoglou and Osman, both of them big enough to avoid a big disadvantage in that mismatch, were aggressive and managed to deny the pass to the big man. Real played three different options after the pick and roll: pass for Llull (and another ball screen), pass for Nocioni (one on one against Perperoglou), and Rodriguez's one on one against Lasme (which finished with a turnover). Only the second one ended up with the white team scoring. That gave them two points in three possessions, which was not enough to win a close game.
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